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The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies: 
Between a Currency and a  
Financial Product 
Hadar Y. Jabotinsky* 
 
Cryptocurrencies are electronically generated and stored  
currencies by which users can trade either real or virtual objects 
with one another. As these digital assets gain popularity, the issue 
of how to regulate them becomes more pressing. Cryptocurrencies 
are attractive due in part to their decentralized, peer-to-peer struc-
ture. This makes them an alternative to national currencies which 
are controlled by central banks. Given that these cryptocurrencies 
are already replacing some of the “regular” national currencies 
and financial products, the question then arises—should they be 
regulated? And if so, how? This paper draws the legal distinction 
between cryptocurrencies which are in fact currency and those 
which are securities disguised as currency. It further suggests that 
in cases where a token is indeed a security, regular securities regu-
lation should apply. In all other cases, anti-fraud measures should 
be in place to protect investors. Further regulation should only  
be put in place if the cryptocurrency starts increasing systemic 
risk in the general financial system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Facebook Inc. unveiled plans to launch a crypto- 
currency in a move that could diversify its business  
from advertising while expanding into financial  
services long dominated by Wall Street. The crypto-
currency, called Libra, will be a secure blockchain-
based payment system backed by hard assets and  
designed for ordinary users, making it among the 
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boldest efforts yet to bring digital currencies into  
the mainstream . . . . The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Wall Street’s main overseer, has 
emerged as the most robust U.S. regulator of crypto- 
currency projects . . . .1 
Bitcoin, Ether, DAO, and Facebook’s new Libra project are  
all types of the emerging technology of cryptocurrencies. Cryp- 
tocurrencies are electronically generated and stored currencies  
by which users can trade either real or virtual objects with one  
another, bypassing traditional central clearinghouses. This technol-
ogy is driving a change in the global economy, both in business  
and finance.2 
Widespread knowledge of cryptocurrencies is leading towards a 
surging number of people using the technology. The attractiveness 
of cryptocurrencies is due in part to their decentralized, peer-to-peer 
structure. This makes them an alternative to national currencies 
which are controlled by central banks.3 This is especially apparent 
in times of financial instability, when cryptocurrencies usage tends 
to rise upwards in the beginning of financial distress.4 Given that 
these cryptocurrencies are starting to replace some of the traditional 
national currencies and financial products, the question then 
arises—should they be regulated? And if so, how? Some countries, 
such as China and South Korea, prohibit Initial Coin Offerings 
(“ICOs”)5 altogether, while others strive to reach an understanding 
 
1 Jeff Horwitz & Parmy Olson, Facebook Unveils Cryptocurrency Libra in Bid to 
Reshape Finance, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-
unveils-crypto-wallet-based-on-currency-libra-11560850141 [https://perma.cc/X2CL-
HSKC]. 
2 DONG HE ET AL., VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 
(2016). 
3 Roee Sarel, Your Bitcoin is Mine: What Does Law and Economics Have to Say About 
Property Rights in Cryptocurrencies? 9–10 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
4 See Maureen Farrell, Bitcoin Prices Surge Post-Cyprus Bailout, CNN MONEY (Mar. 
28, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/28/investing/bitcoin-cyprus/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/SM5S-A55R]; see also Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Roee Sarel, How Crisis 
Affects Crypto: Coronavirus as a Test Case 8 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
5 An ICO is the process whereby “real” money is exchanged in return for the token. 
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of the currencies in order to come up with coherent regulation.6  
In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought 
enforcement actions against virtual currency-related investments, 
asserting that they were in fact securities.7 A year later, the SEC  
issued an investor alert concerning cryptocurrencies stating: 
The rise of Bitcoin and other virtual and digital  
currencies creates new concerns for investors. A  
new product, technology, or innovation—such as 
Bitcoin—has the potential to give rise both to frauds 
and high-risk investment opportunities. Potential  
investors can be easily enticed with the promise of 
high returns in a new investment space and also may 
be less skeptical when assessing something novel, 
new and cutting-edge.8 
In July 2017, the SEC issued the “DAO Report,” an investiga-
tion related to the issue of 1.15 billion DAO tokens that were meant 
to create a new form of corporate governance.9 In the report, the 
SEC discusses the issue of applying the federal securities laws to 
DAO tokens concluding that although no enforcement action should 
 
6 Saheli Roy Choudhury, China Bans Companies from Raising Money Through ICOs, 
Asks Local Regulators to Inspect 60 Major Platforms, CNBC (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/04/chinese-icos-china-bans-fundraising-through-initial-
coin-offerings-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/MS64-VSUT]. The EU has recently 
published a proposal for regulating crypto-assets which is likely to be ratified,  
it makes a distinction between utility tokens, asset-reference tokens (stable coins)  
and payment tokens (proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Markets in Crypto-Assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM 
2020), sec. 9).  
7 See In re Voorhees, No. 9592, 2014 SEC LEXIS 1922, at *3, *7 (June 3, 2014); SEC 
v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 
2013). 
8 Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC (May 
7, 2014) (emphasis omitted), http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/investor 
alertsiabitcoin.html [http://perma.cc/NFB3-QTUN]. 
9 SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [perma.cc/CMQ2-M9SQ] [hereinafter DAO REPORT]. 
DAO tokens are tokens which are meant to automate organizational governance and 
decision making. SEE CHRISTOPH JENTZSCH, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS 
ORGANIZATION TO AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2016), https://archive.org/stream/ 
DecentralizedAutonomousOrganizations/WhitePaper_djvu.txt [https://perma.cc/2EL2-
7TU2]. 
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be taken due to the conduct and activities known to it at the  
time, the DAO tokens are indeed securities under the Securities Act  
of 1933 (“Securities Act”)10 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“Exchange Act”).11 Later on, in September 2017, the head  
of the SEC clarified that ICOs are one of the SEC’s top regulatory 
priorities.12 In April 2019, the SEC finally issued its long-awaited 
framework for “investment contract” analysis of digital assets.13 
However, the SEC guidelines are only recommendations which are 
not legally binding and at some points they still leave consider- 
able ambiguity with regard to the question of what types of crypto- 
currencies should be regulated by the SEC and how. 
The question of how to regulate cryptocurrencies is compelling 
throughout the life of the coin, but is of special interest during the 
ICO because the value of the cryptocurrency depends not only on 
the value of the currency, but also on issues of security.14 As these 
coins exist in the virtual world, the sites on which they are traded 
are vulnerable to hackers.15 Thus, even if hacking the network of the 
coin itself is difficult, other sites such as cryptocurrency exchanges 
are more susceptible to theft.16 
The ICO process is also vulnerable. An ICO is a process in 
which people buy virtual tokens from the makers of the crypto-
 
10 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1933). 
11 DAO REPORT, supra note 9. 
12 John McCrank, SEC Chief Says Cyber Crimes Risks are Substantial, Systemic, 
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-enforcement/sec-chief-
says-cyber-crime-risks-are-substantial-systemic-idUSKCN1BH094 
[https://perma.cc/2ZJW-X9VZ]. 
13 SEC, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS 
(April 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-
digital-assets [https://perma.cc/J7E4-PETZ] [hereinafter SEC GUIDELINES]. An investment 
contract constitutes a security according to U.S. law, thus the SEC has the power to regulate 
it. 
14 Lucinda Shen, Hackers Have Stolen $400 Million From ICOs, FORTUNE (Jan. 23, 
2018) https://fortune.com/2018/01/22/ico-2018-coin-bitcoin-hack/ [https://perma.cc/ 
D8SU-8AJP]. 
15 Id. 
16 Brian Fung, Why Bitcoin Exchanges Keep Getting Hacked – and How to Protect 
Yourself, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/06/20/why-bitcoin-exchanges-keep-getting-hacked-and-how-to-protect-
yourself/ [https://perma.cc/DE8Q-UCK8]. 
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currency.17 As the startup issuing the tokens grows, these tokens are 
expected to increase in value.18 This is a method of raising invest-
ment via crowdfunding, as a means to reduce transaction costs as-
sociated with raising capital elsewhere.19 In the past, crowdfunding 
was not possible due to the heavy transaction costs associated with 
raising small amounts of money from many different investors.20 
Today, however, this problem is solved by using the internet, which 
reduces transaction costs and allows for a more efficient allocation 
of money.21 Although the makers of these tokens chose to raise 
money through ICOs and not through IPOs, there are similarities 
between buying some of these tokens and buying stock in an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) of a company.22 Unlike in an IPO, potential 
investors in an ICO now receive little or not enough information.23 
Additionally, until 2017, ICOs have remained mostly “under the  
radar” of the securities authorities.24 However, ICOs are frequent- 
ly the target of cyberattacks and—without proper disclosure rules—
investors sometimes pay for tokens but are left with nothing.25  
A famous, but not uncommon, example of such a cyberattack  
occurred on July 17, 2017 when the CoinDash website launched an 
ICO. The website was hacked and $7M of the investment, all in 
 
17 Christian Hofmann, The Changing Concept of Money: A Threat to the Monetary 
System or an Opportunity for The Financial Sector?, 21 EUR. BUS. ORG L. REV. 37, 40 
n.10 (2020). 
18 Why Invest in an ICO?, CRYPTONEWS, https://cryptonews.com/guides/why-invest-in-
an-ico.htm [https://perma.cc/C6TX-9GK5]. 
19 Usman W. Chohan, Are Cryptocurrencies Truly Trustless?, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND 
MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 77, 84 (Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019). 
20 Steven C. Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Law, 1 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). 
21 Id. 
22 In an IPO, early investors, such as large institutions, purchase some of the stocks at a 
discount via early agreements. Once the stocks are sold to the public, the institutional 
investors which invested in the stocks sell their stocks on the market and make a profit. See  
Othalia Doe-Bruce, Blockchain and Alternative Sources of Financing in CRYPTOFINANCE 
AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 91, 98 (Stéphane Goutte et al. eds., 2019). 
23 See generally Seth Holoweiko, What is an ICO? Defining a Security on the 
Blockchain, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Jabotinsky & Sarel, supra note 4. 
24 In 2017 the SEC issued the first report relating to cryptocurrencies: the DAO Report. 
See DAO REPORT, supra note 9. 
25 Sondes Mbarek et al., Are Virtual Currencies Virtuous? Ethical and Environmental 
Issues, in CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE 29, 41 (Stéphane Goutte et al. 
eds., 2019). 
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Ethereum’s cryptocurrency, Ether, went to hackers and not to  
CoinDash in exchange for tokens.26 
Although the technology underlying most cryptocurrencies is 
very similar, the logic behind them differs. Some cryptocurrencies 
function as regular national currencies with traditional currency 
traits.27 As such, they provide a medium of exchange, unit of  
account, and/or store of value.28 Other cryptocurrencies, however, 
may represent other rights as well. This interesting phenomenon  
causes some cryptocurrencies to be viewed as closer to real national 
currencies while others are viewed as closer to financial products 
(such as securities or derivatives).29 
This Article explores how the “safety” of these coins relates  
to issues of disclosure. It seeks to answer two key questions—how 
should cryptocurrencies be regulated, and how much disclosure 
should be demanded from the corporations that issue them? The  
academic debate about what a cryptocurrency is—whether it is a 
currency or some type of different financial product—has already 
begun with Bitcoin.30 This Article expands the current Bitcoin  
debate to other types of cryptocurrencies and argues that different 
types of cryptocurrencies require different regulatory approaches. 
This argument is supported by comparing different types of crypto-
currencies to various financial products (such as stocks, deriva- 
tives, forwards, and options)—a discussion that, to date, the litera-
ture has not addressed enough. It is important to note from the out-
set that this Article deals with regulatory questions pertaining to  
financial regulation and leaves aside questions regarding other types  
of regulation such as anti-money laundering, tax regulation, and 
 
26 John Leyden, CoinDash Crowdfunding Hack Further Dents Trust in Crypto-Trading 
World, THE REG. (July 17, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2017/07/18/coindash_hack/ [https://perma.cc/V9JK-5XGM]. In this specific case 
investors received the tokens they paid for and CoinDash was left with the loss. 
27 See generally CRYPTOFINANCE AND MECHANISMS OF EXCHANGE (Stéphane Goutte et 
al. eds., 2019). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2011). 
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fraud, which are also relevant to the broader discussion of regulating 
cryptocurrencies.31 
Parts I–III of this Article set out the theoretical background  
of the regulation of securities and financial products in the United 
States. Part I reviews the principals behind securities regulation and 
supervision in general, to assist in the discussion of how crypto- 
currencies should be regulated. This discussion will include the  
theory of financial markets and why we need to supervise them.  
As most ICOs take place outside of the United States, Part II  
discusses the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities laws. Part III will  
then explain what constitutes a security under U.S. law. Next, Part 
IV analyzes the different types of cryptocurrencies. Finally, Part V  
presents arguments for how cryptocurrencies should be regulated. 
I. THE NEED FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 
As mentioned in the introduction, cryptocurrencies are either 
meant to replace fiat currencies or are a substitute for some of the 
traditional financial assets. As such, before discussing how to regu-
late them, we must first understand why we regulate financial  
markets and what financial regulation is meant to achieve. Financial 
markets bring together buyers and sellers of financial instruments, 
establishing the right price for the traded financial instrument.32  
The price of the traded financial instrument is determined—like the 
price of any other product in regular non-financial markets—by the 
supply and demand curve.33 However, financial instruments have a 
special trait that distinguishes them from non-financial products or 
goods: the benefits which they confer are largely unknown to a large 
extent because the product’s prospective earnings are unknown.34 
 
31 See, e.g., Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of 
Cryptocurrencies, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 53, 56–57 (2015–2016) (discussing how 
relative anonymity and an absence of regulating intermediaries make it more difficult to 
identify those who transact in illicit value transfers); see generally Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & 
Michal Lavi, Speak Out: Verifying and Unmasking Cryptocurrency User Identity 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
32 See JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N. GORDON, 
COLIN MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 101 (2016). 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
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Therefore, their value is based on the buyers’ predictions of poten-
tial value increase over time.35 
The process of predicting future value of financial instruments 
and subsequently pricing them is at the heart of the financial  
markets. Additionally, the process of predicting and pricing pro-
vides a main function to financial markets—delivering information 
about investors’ beliefs regarding the future price of the assets sold 
in the market.36 Therefore, the price of a financial instrument should 
reflect the future price at the date the investor expects to sell the 
instrument plus the present value of the stream of future dividend 
payments and interest rate.37 But in order to determine the compo-
nents of the price and to be able to put a price tag on the instrument, 
investors should have all the relevant information about the firm or 
the underlying asset of the financial instrument.38 
This is the main role of the securities regulator—providing  
information to the market, mainly through the vehicle of disclosure 
requirements which, in turn helps the market assign the correct price 
tag to the products sold.39 For example, the price of the firm’s secu-
rities is expected to include any information about the firm’s man-
agement quality as long as the information is public.40 If the infor-
mation is positive, the price of the share is expected to increase as 
investors rush to purchase it. In other words, there is a hypothesis 
that as long as the market receives correct and full information about 
a firm, the market will be efficient.41 
Some investors might occasionally gain access to private  
information which has not yet been disclosed. For example, a firm’s 
management might know about a strategic change the firm is about 




37 Id. at 102. 
38 Id. at 108. 
39 Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, Financial Regulation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 5 (A. Marciano & G.B. Ramello eds., 2017). 
40 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32. 
41 Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 
59, 60 (2003). Note, however, that this hypothesis has been criticized as markets seem to 
over or under react to new pieces of information and to take into account irrelevant and 
plausible information. See, e.g., ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 105. 
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who have this information are called “insiders.”42 As most investors 
are unaware of this information, it is not likely that they will trade 
on it and influence the price of the shares.43 Therefore, in order  
to prevent investors from trading to their advantage by using  
undisclosed, privileged information, all securities markets around 
the world prohibit insider trading.44 Consequently, uninformed  
investors can enter the market trusting that all investors have the 
same level of information when making a trading decision and  
that insiders cannot benefit from their additional knowledge at the  
expense of other investors.45 
As a result of financial market anomalies, securities regulation 
is also needed in order to ensure efficient allocation of resources.  
If a share is mispriced, meaning that the price does not accurately  
reflect all the relevant information, an incorrect investment will be 
allocated to that share.46 Thus, securities regulation plays a crucial 
role in reducing product information asymmetries and improving  
the pricing mechanism of securities.47 
Securities markets, like other markets, incorporate price  
information which results from the activity of the traders buy- 
ing and selling securities in the market. Therefore, information is 
needed to make the markets more efficient and to receive an  
accurate price for the products sold in the market.48 The efficiency 
of the market is a function of how fast the market can gather,  
process, verify, and distribute the information among traders.49  
Information intermediaries such as underwriters, auditors, lawyers, 
CRAs, and analysts help the traders understand and evaluate the  
inherent risks of the traded products.50 These intermediaries  
analyze information with respect to the following—the issuer,  
its business model, ownership, financial situation, earnings, and  
 
42 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 104. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 106.   
46 Jabotinsky, supra note 39, at 4. 
47 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 106. 
48 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanism of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 593 (1984). 
49 See id. 
50 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 119. 
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strategic plans; the issuer’s market and industry, new regulations, 
new entrants, and the status of its competitors; past trading in the 
firm’s securities; and other significant events, such as political 
changes or natural disasters which might have an effect on the  
issuer’s business.51 
In a perfect world, investors would pay for the information they 
receive from these intermediaries. However, information is a pub-
lic good and thus it is not easily excludable; once produced and  
transmitted to the investors who pay for it, there is a chance  
that other investors will try to get a free ride by obtaining the  
information without paying for it.52 The result is a problematic fund-
ing model—instead of being paid by the investors, the intermediar-
ies are paid by the issuer of the financial product.53 This gives rise 
to a series of conflicts of interest and to entrenchment of the inter-
mediaries’ incentives.54 Regulation is also necessary to decrease and 
manage these conflicts of interest.55 
Last but not least, regulation is also needed to reduce systemic 
risk—the risk that the entire market or financial system will col-
lapse.56 This risk is increased by links and interdependencies, where 
 
51 Id. at 118. See generally Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial 
Intermediaries Do?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 271 (2001) (broadly discussing the role of 
financial intermediaries); George M. Giaglis, Stefan Klein & Robert M.  
O’Keefe, The Role of Intermediaries in Electronic Marketplaces: Developing a 
Contingency Model, 12 INFO. SYS. J. 231 (2002) (discussing the role of intermediaries in 
online markets). 
52 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 32, at 121. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 For example, public companies in the United States are required to provide the public 
with independently audited financial statements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(aa), 78(m)(a)(2). Credit 
Rating Agencies (CRA) are required to use standardized forms which enable users to 
compare ratings between different CRAs and to disclose their rating methodologies. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street & Consumer Protection Act § 932(a)(8) (2010); Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations: Correction, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,576 (Oct. 14, 2014) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249, & 249b). Analysts are regulated in the United States 
according to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. FINRA  
Rule 2241, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,482 (July 22, 2015); FINRA Rule 2242, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,628 
(June 7, 2016). 
56 Marco A. Espinosa-Vega et al., Some Implications of Systemic Risk and the Design of 
Regulatory Architecture, in MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATORY POLICIES: THE NEW ROAD 
TO FINANCIAL STABILITY? 207–14 (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2011). 
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the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a cascad-
ing failure.57 It is also related to externalities—firms taking on more 
risk than is economically efficient because the results of the reali-
zation of the risk will be borne by society as a whole and not sole-
ly by the entity taking the excessive risk.58 Financial regulation is  
necessary to prevent or minimize this risk. 
For all these reasons, securities markets should be regulated—
and indeed they are. However, for obvious reasons, securities regu-
lation applies only to instruments that are considered securities. 
Therefore, before we can further discuss the regulation of crypto-
currencies, we should first examine what constitutes a security under 
U.S. law. This is meaningful because if an instrument is considered 
a security, then the offering of that instrument is subject to securities 
regulation, which means it must be registered under the Securities 
Act unless it falls under one of the exemptions offered by the  
law.59 Such registration increases the cost of selling the instruments.  
Requiring cryptocurrencies to register would significantly increase 
the cost of the ICO.60 Furthermore, if cryptocurrencies are indeed 
considered a security, the sites which assist in the trading of tokens 
and in handling the ICO would face regulatory issues as they may 
be treated as unregistered brokers or investment advisors according  
to SEC rules. 
All this is true with reference to U.S. regulation. However, to 
cover the topic fully, a preliminary discussion must be made with 
respect to the question of the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities 
law. As a vast number of ICOs occur outside the U.S. territorial  
borders, the relevant question is—do they fall under U.S. law?  




58 Jabotinsky, supra note 39, at 4. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 77(z)(3) (establishing exceptions to the Securities Act). 
60 ICO Law and Compliance: Is Your ICO Subject to Regulation?, SKALEX, 
https://www.skalex.io/ico-law-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/3VAF-WCFY]. 
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II. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW 
The United States has vast and long-standing experience in seek-
ing to apply national securities laws extraterritorially.61 The courts 
have developed a few tests to justify extraterritoriality62—the stat-
utory position strengthens these tests, especially concerning anti-
fraud prohibitions.63 
Prior to the decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank,64 
the Second Circuit paved the way for the extraterritoriality of the 
securities regulation’s anti-fraud provisions by mainly applying  
two tests: (1) the effects test, which examined whether the wrong-
ful conduct had a substantial and foreseeable negative effect on  
the United States or its citizens;65 and (2) the conduct test, which  
by contrast required the wrongful conduct to take place within the 
United States.66 
In Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell67 and sub-
sequent cases, courts applied the conduct test to cover gray areas 
which were not addressed by the effects test.68 The conduct test was 
able to bridge this gap because it does not require proof of harm but 
merely requires wrongful conduct.69 Thus, the conduct test also  
assisted U.S. courts in obtaining jurisdiction in cases where the 
harmful act was conducted inside the United States but targeted 
 
61 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 929P(b), 929Y; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 
200 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated 
by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
62 SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
63 See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). 
64 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
65 Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for 
the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 95 (2003); Junsun Park, Global Expansion of National 
Securities Laws: Extraterritoriality and Jurisdictional Conflicts, 12 U.N.H.L. REV. 69, 70 
(2014); Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247. 
66 Park, supra note 65, at 71; Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247. 
67 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). 
68 Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1326; J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. 
SECURITIES LAW § 11:29 (2012); Park, supra note 65, at 71; Chang, supra note 65, at 96. 
69 Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1326; HICKS, supra note 68, at § 11:29; Park, supra note 65, at 
71; Chang, supra note 65, at 96.  
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foreign investors.70 The court held that the conduct test would be 
satisfied if “(1) the defendant’s activities in the United States were 
more than ‘merely preparatory’ to a securities fraud conducted else-
where, and (2) these activities or culpable failures to act within the 
United States ‘directly caused’ the claimed losses.”71 
Although these are two separate tests—each of which can be  
applied by itself—the courts could also combine them in order to 
strengthen a given case. The Second Circuit, for example, did this 
in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.72 Throughout the years, these 
tests were adopted in a number of courts across the United States, 
each tweaking the form of the test to fit the decisions of the court at 
hand.73 When applying the conduct test, for example, the DC Circuit 
demanded that “the American-based conduct at issue had to itself 
constitute a securities law violation ….”74 This application of the 
test is much stricter than the application of the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits which required that the conduct made on U.S. soil be  
material to the success of the fraud and that it constitutes a substan- 
tial part of it.75 The most lenient form of the test was used by the 
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits which required that only part  
of the activity of a securities fraud to be carried out on U.S. soil.76  
The different test interpretations of the courts made it difficult for 
individuals and the market to draw a bright line demonstrating what 
falls under the test and what does not.77 
 
70 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975). 
71 Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Alfadda v. Fenn, 
935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991)), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 
U.S. 247 (2010); Park, supra note 65, at 71. 
72 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975). 
73 Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American 
Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 207, 217 (2009); Park, supra note 65, at 72. 
74 Park, supra note 65, at 72. 
75 Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998), abrogated by 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); see also Robinson v. TCI/US W. 
Comm., Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997). 
76 Park, supra note 65, at 72; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977), and abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 
U.S. 247 (2010); see also Cont’l Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 
F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir.1979); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir.1983). 
77 Choi & Guzman, supra note 73, at 217. 
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This ambiguity also existed with respect to the effects test. 
Courts disagreed regarding the degree to which the behavior in ques-
tion needed to have an effect on the United States or its citizens.78 
This question of degree only became more difficult to answer with 
the development of the internet and other new technologies.79 Amer-
ican legal scholars and practitioners felt a growing unease when con-
sidering the possibility that these tests might breach another coun-
try’s sovereignty and lead to a deterioration in foreign relations.80 
In 2010, the Supreme Court cancelled both the conduct and the 
effect tests in Morrison.81 This case involved Australian sharehold-
ers who purchased stock on an Australian stock exchange and who 
filed suit in the United States against an Australian bank for violat-
ing U.S. securities law.82 The plaintiffs contended that the bank 
made material misstatements with regard to an expected purchase of 
a mortgage servicing company by the bank.83 The District Court 
ruled that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case 
and the Appellate Court affirmed the decision.84 The Supreme Court 
agreed with the lower court’s dismissal but found the lower courts’ 
reasoning85 for deciding whether to grant extraterritorial applicabil-
ity to U.S. securities laws flawed.86 The Court held that no explicit 
statutory instruction existed for the extraterritoriality conduct of 
U.S. securities laws.87 However, after summing up the shortcomings 
of the conduct and effect tests and ruling them out, the Court intro-
duced a new test. According to the Court, the main test that should 
be used in order to determine the reach of Section 10(b) of the 
 
78 Park, supra note 65, at 73. 
79 George Nnona, International Insider Trading: Reassessing the Propriety and 
Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 185, 198 
(2001); Park, supra note 65, at 73. 
80 Park, supra note 65, at 73. 
81 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247.   
82 Id. at 252–53 (specifically, the claim was that the bank violated the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 20(a) and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-
5). 
83 Id. at 252. 
84 Id. at 253. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 253–54. 
87 See id. at 255 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”). 
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Securities Exchange Act (“Section 10(b)”), which deals with fraud-
ulent behavior, is the transactional test.88 The Court held that in or-
der to qualify for the test, the fraudulent behavior must accompany 
the purchase or the sale of a security, whether or not it is a registered 
security on a national securities exchange.89 The Court further em-
phasized that one of the fundamental dimensions of the case is the 
fact that the plaintiffs and the defendant were foreign.90 For the test 
to be applicable, the fraudulent behavior should involve “trans- 
actions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic 
transactions in other securities….”91 
However, the new transactional test left the market confused. 
Some argued that foreign transactions are protected as long as the 
securities are listed on a U.S. exchange.92 Others disagreed and 
claimed that the language used by Justice Scalia and the majority 
shows that the Supreme Court believed that the extraterritoriality of 
Section 10(b) applies only when the security transactions  
occurred within the United States.93 The test also severely restricted 
U.S. regulators’ ability to prosecute persons who violate U.S.  
securities laws but trade outside the United States.94 This led to a 
concern that U.S. regulators would not be able to protect the mar-
ket’s integrity, leading to a loss of investor confidence in the secu-
rities markets.95 Consequently, Congress decided to intervene and 
restore both the effects test and the conduct test in actions brought 
by the SEC and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) by enact- 
ing a new provision in the Dodd-Frank Act.96 The new provision  
established a statutory basis for extraterritoriality of the anti-fraud  
provisions in both the Securities Exchange Act and the Securities 
Act which stipulates: 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. The dis-
trict courts of the United States and the United States 
 
88 Id. at 268–70. 
89 Id. at 266–67. 
90 Id. at 268. 
91 Id. at 267. 
92 Park, supra note 65, at 76. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 76–77. 
95 Id. 
96 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 929P(b), 929Y. 
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courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of  
an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the 
Commission or the United States alleging a violation 
of the antifraud provisions of this title involving:  
(1) conduct within the United States that consti- 
tutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, 
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the 
United States and involves only foreign investors;  
or (2) conduct occurring outside the United States 
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the 
United States.97 
The new provision clearly provides the SEC and the DOJ with 
the power to prosecute in situations of offshore securities fraud.98 
This provision, combined with the Morrison decision, equips U.S. 
regulators with extraterritoriality powers with respect to the anti-
fraud provisions of securities laws.99 As discussed in Morrison, the 
Supreme Court clarified that the transactional test can be inferred 
directly from the anti-fraud provisions—therefore, the SEC can  
enforce against fraudulent extraterritorial actions connected to U.S. 
securities transactions, even if the fraudulent actions have an extra-
territorial dimension.100 Section 30 of the Exchange Act is another 
source of extraterritorial power, as it provides the SEC with the abil-
ity to prosecute a broker or a dealer who commits a securities fraud 
offshore in order to circumvent U.S. securities regulation.101 In order 
to use this provision, the SEC would need to promote rules in  
accordance with this provision.102 A third and perhaps most power-
ful basis for extraterritoriality is the new section added to Section 
929P of the Dodd-Frank Act.103 This section overcomes a situation 
in which a case does not meet the requirements of the transactional 




99 Park, supra note 65, at 78. 
100 Id.  
101 Richard Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It 
Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 215 (2011). 
102 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268 (2010). 
103 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 929P(b), 929Y. 
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against the perpetrator by using the conduct or effects tests which 
were enacted into the legislation.104 
In the case of cryptocurrencies, a great deal of ICOs are  
conducted outside the United States. However, if the SEC believes 
that the issue or the purchase of the tokens has a “foreseeable sub-
stantial effect within the United States,”105 it can still press charges 
against issuers or traders of the token that violate the U.S. securities 
laws. The next step of the analysis should then ask—what con-
stitutes a security under U.S. law?   
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SECURITY UNDER U.S. LAW? 
The Securities and Exchange Commission issued an 
investigative report today cautioning market par- 
ticipants that offers and sales of digital assets by  
“virtual” organizations are subject to the require-
ments of the federal securities laws. Such offers and 
sales, conducted by organizations using distributed 
ledger or blockchain technology, have been referred 
to, among other things, as “Initial Coin Offerings”  
or “Token Sales.” Whether a particular invest- 
ment transaction involves the offer or sale of a secu-
rity—regardless of the terminology or technology 
used—will depend on the facts and circumstances, 
including the economic realities of the transaction. 
“The innovative technology behind these virtual 
transactions does not exempt securities offerings and 
trading platforms from the regulatory framework  
designed to protect investors and the integrity of  
the markets,” said Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director 
of the SEC’s Enforcement Division.106 
 
104 Park, supra note 65, at 79. 
105 Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b) (emphasis added). 
106 Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a 
Digital Asset, Were Securities U.S. Securities Laws May Apply to Offers, Sales, and 
Trading of Interests in Virtual Organizations (July 15, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131 [https://perma.cc/T2LV-A5XM].  
136 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:118 
 
Section 5 of the Securities Act and the pursuant SEC rules are 
full of prohibitions, conditions, and exceptions with regard to the 
registration of securities.107 However, the basic principle is clear— 
unless exempted by law, all securities offerings must be accom-
panied by registration with the SEC.108 An issuer is prohibited from 
selling a security and entering into a contract of sale109 until the reg-
istration statement with the SEC is in force.110 The question is then, 
what would be considered a “security” under U.S. federal law? 
The United States regulates securities mainly under two laws: 
(1) the Securities Act, and (2) the Exchange Act. These two pieces 
of legislation were enacted by Congress following fraudulent  
sales and lack of information in the U.S. securities markets which 
led to the 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent Great Depres-
sion.111 The definition under the Exchange Act describes a “secu-
rity” as any of the following.112 
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, se-
curity based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of in-
debtedness, certificate of interest or participation in 
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral 
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on 
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index 
of securities (including any interest therein or based 
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, op-
tion, or privilege entered into on a national securities 
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, 
any interest or instrument commonly known as a “se-
curity”, or any certificate of interest or participation 
 
107 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c). 
108 Id. 
109 15 U.S.C.  § 77b(a)(3). 
110 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1). 
111 See LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 281 (5th 
ed. 2014). 
112 The Securities Act of 1933 defines a security in similar terms. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
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in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include 
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or 
banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time 
of issuance of not exceeding nine months,  
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the 
maturity of which is likewise limited.113 
The Supreme Court observed that the definition of “security”  
includes “commonly known” documents which are traded for  
investment or speculation as well as certificates of interest or  
participation in profit sharing mechanisms.114 In another ruling, the  
Supreme Court further stated that when an instrument falls under 
what is commonly known as a security, there is no need for  
courts to analyze each instrument on a case-by-case basis since  
some instruments are clearly “securities,” in accordance with the  
legislator’s intention.115  
If a financial instrument or investment does not fall under  
what is “commonly known” as a security, it may still be considered 
as such according to the definition of an “investment contract.”  
This term is the basket term by which many assets have been  
determined to be securities and is also the term which is analyzed by 
the SEC Guidelines from April 2019.116 Investment contracts were 
defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. W.J. Howey Co.117 To fall under the definition, an 
instrument must meet three main criteria: (1) an investment of 
money; (2) a common enterprise; and (3) an expectation of profits 
which are derived solely from the efforts of others.118 Over the  
years, courts have maintained most of this definition, but replaced 
the word “solely” with the question of whether the efforts made by 
the managers of the firm (other than the investor) are undeniably 
 
113 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (emphasis added). 
114 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946). 
115 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990). 
116 SEC GUIDELINES, supra note 13. 
117 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
118   Id. at 301 (emphasis added). 
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significant ones.119 This definition alone already dictates a need for 
differing regulatory responses to cryptocurrencies that change value 
based on the efforts of others, and those that do not. 
IV. DIFFERENT TYPES OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
Most current cryptocurrencies which exist today are based on a 
technology called the “blockchain.”120 This technology connects  
users to one another through a series of blocks, which together build 
a platform for digital assets.121 A blockchain is usually managed by 
a peer-to-peer network, in which peers collectively adhere to a pro-
tocol for validating new blocks.122 Once a block is formed, it is im-
possible to alter it without traces.123 Put simply, it is like having a 
common Excel page shared by an entire community of users. Once 
something is changed on one Excel sheet, the same Excel sheets on 
all the computers of all of the users are updated automatically. Since 
it does not exist in any centralized physical location, hacking it is 
almost impossible.124 In other words, the blockchain is a distributed 
ledger which maintains a constantly growing structure of blocks that 
preserve data and hold batches of separate transactions.125 The com-
pleted blocks are added in a linear and chronological order.126  
Each block contains a timestamp and information link which points 
to a previous block.127 Blockchain technology makes use of smart  
contracts, which are run and verified by many computers to ensure 
trustworthiness and allow users to instruct the computer program  
to transfer the currency from one to another given that certain 
 
119 SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973); accord SEC 
v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974). 
120 See generally ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOSEPH BONNEAU, EDWARD FELTEN, ANDREW 
MILLER & STEVEN GOLDFEDER, BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A 
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016). 
121 Id. at 11. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 For the exact technological reasons why, see generally NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 
120. 
125 Id. at 11. 
126 Michael Nofer, Peter Gomber, Oliver Hinz & Dirk Schiereck, Blockchain, 59 BUS. 
INFO. SYS. ENG. 183, 184 (2017). 
127 Id. 
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conditions apply.128 In other words, they are programs that execute 
“if this happens, then do that” commands. 
In March 2013, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) released its guidance on 
virtual currencies.129 In these guidelines decentralized virtual  
currency is defined by FinCEN as including “virtual currency  
(1) that has no central repository and no single administrator, and 
(2) that persons may obtain by their own computing or manufactur-
ing effort.”130 The Financial Action Task Force (the international 
organization for the fight against money laundering) described it as: 
A digital representation of value that can be digitally 
traded and functions as: (1) a medium of exchange; 
and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of 
value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., 
when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal offer 
of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or 
guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above 
functions only by agreement within the community 
of users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency is 
distinguished from fiat currency (a.k.a. “real cur-
rency,” “real money,” or “national currency”), which 
is the coin and paper money of a country that is des-
ignated as its legal tender; circulates; and is custom-
arily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in 
the issuing country. It is distinct from e-money, 
which is a digital representation of fiat currency  
used to electronically transfer value denominated in 
fiat currency.131 
 
128 Jabotinsky & Lavi, supra note 31, at 18.  
129 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINCEN, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S 
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 




131 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF REPORT: VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, KEY 
DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT Risks 4 (June 2014), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB2J-K36K] [hereinafter FATF REPORT]. 
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These definitions of virtual currencies—also popularly known 
as cryptocurrencies—are valid definitions for all cryptocurrencies 
discussed in this Article. 
In general, cryptocurrencies have diverse purposes. Some  
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, are used as regular currency and 
enable payments on the blockchain.132 Other cryptocurrencies, such 
as Ether, are used to execute smart contracts which replace tradi-
tional intermediaries in the financial markets.133 Some cryptocurren-
cies exist as a platform for developing new cryptocurrencies, while 
others, like the KIN token by Kik, are issued as a means to raise 
capital for the firm issuing the ICO.134 However, the complication 
does not end there, some cryptocurrencies were created to promote 
a social cause, such as Solar Coin,135 which is meant to promote so-
lar electricity generation, while others, such as Ether, are meant  
for traditional business purposes. These differences are crucial when 
trying to design a financial regulatory regime for cryptocurrencies. 
Next, this Article will survey some of the most common crypto- 
currencies, while emphasizing the differences between them. These  
distinctions will then be used to design a framework for regulating 
different types of cryptocurrencies. 
A. Bitcoin 
Based on a computer science research paper by Satoshi  
Nakamoto, Bitcoin was created in 2009.136 Nakamoto designed a 
peer-to-peer network which allowed users to transfer Bitcoins to 
others using their computers or smart-phones.137 The Bitcoin system 
is a cloud-based decentralized currency system which does not rely 
on a central authority, such as a central bank or a company, to issue 
 
132 Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander B. Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: 
Operational Issues and Best Practices for Institutional Cryptocurrency Trading (Oct. 2017) 




135 See SOLARCOIN, https://solarcoin.org/ [https://perma.cc/9NN4-Q4FX]. 
136 See CRAIG K. EWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43339, BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, 
ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2015). 
137 SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1 (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma. cc/8DGC-THBR]. 
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Bitcoins or to verify the transactions of its users.138 Instead, transac-
tions are verified and processed by using principles of cryptog-
raphy.139 Individual users on the blockchain can generate new 
Bitcoins through a process called “mining.” They do so by contrib-
uting their computing power to perform complicated calculations 
that enable transactions on the blockchain network, secure the net-
work, and keep users in sync.140 If the user is the first to contribute, 
the system rewards her/him with a new Bitcoin. The mining process 
helps the blockchain to continue and to be constantly verified.141 
Bitcoin is often referred to as the first “digital currency.”142  
Indeed, Bitcoin shares certain characteristics with currency, but it is 
also a distributed ledger system through which property titles can be 
recorded and documents can be authenticated.143 As such, in many 
ways, it replaces the traditional intermediaries in the financial mar-
kets. Before Bitcoin was invented, an intermediary was necessary to 
make an electronic transfer. Nowadays, Bitcoin makes the interme-
diaries redundant as the system records all transactions and all users 
can observe the transactions on the blockchain. Furthermore, the 
system ensures that once a user has sent money to another user,  
the money is also removed from the sender’s account.144 Each new 
transaction on the blockchain will first check that the money  
intended for transfer has not already been spent.145 This initial check 
solves the problem of “double spending,”146 which occurs when a 
participant simultaneously sends the same single unit of currency to 
two different users on the net.147 
 
138 CRAIG K. EWELL ET AL., supra note 136, at 2–3. 
139  See EWELL ET AL., supra note 136. 
140 Jeffery E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry, Is Bitcoin a Security?, 21 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 
3–4 (2015). 
141 Id. at 4. 
142 Francois R. Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, 317 CHI. FED LETTER 1, 1 (2013). 
143 Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: 
Securities, Derivatives and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 147–48 
(2014). 
144  EWELL ET AL., supra note 136, at 2–3. 
145 Brito et al., supra note 143, at 149; EWELL ET AL., supra note 136, at 2. 
146 Id. 
147140  Alberts & Fry, supra note 140, at 3. 
142 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:118 
 
Upon entering the system, users receive a private key—similar 
to an account code—which enables the user to access his or her ac-
count.148 Additionally, a public key is issued and used by others who 
would like to transfer Bitcoins into this account; this number is sim-
ilar to the IBAN number used by banks in order to enable interna-
tional money transfers.149 As users do not expose their identity on 
the network, anonymity is maintained.150 As noted above, other  
users on this network are called “miners.” These “miners” allow the 
network to use their personal computers and to invest their resources 
in making the “blocks” on the blockchain faster and safer in ex-
change for receiving new Bitcoins which are mined from the sys-
tem.151 Once the system reaches twenty-one million Bitcoins, min-
ing will no longer be an option.152 Bitcoin does not have an under-
lying asset, thus its price does not depend on an asset price but rather 
on the demand for Bitcoins.153 This demand is also a derivative of 
how safe the users believe Bitcoin and its blockchain technology 
are. In fact, the relevant uncertainty of Bitcoin holders with regards 
to the token is apparent in the token’s price volatility.154 For exam-
ple, for the period ranging from October 2016 to October 2017, the 
market capitalization of the Bitcoin “increased from $10.1 to $79.7 
billion, while the price jumped from $616 to $4800.”155 
B. Ether 
Ether is a cryptocurrency developed by the Ethereum Founda-
tion.156 Ethereum developed its own blockchain which enables  
the fast execution of smart contracts and allows users, through  
its open source, to create their own cryptocurrencies.157 Users of the 
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Ethereum blockchain are able to create an automatic supply chain 
which incorporates both financial and physical needs. The Founda-
tion itself describes its Token in the following way: 
Ether is a necessary element—a fuel—for operating 
the distributed application platform Ethereum. It is a 
form of payment made by the clients of the platform 
to the machines executing the requested operations. 
To put it another way, ether is the incentive ensuring 
that developers write quality applications (wasteful 
code costs more), and that the network remains 
healthy (people are compensated for their contrib-
uted resources).158 
In other words, anyone who wants to use Ethereum’s block-
chain capabilities can only do so by buying the foundation’s crypto-
currency. Indeed, looking at the changes in price of Ether, it is highly 
affected by the decisions of large corporations to join Ethereum’s 
blockchain.159 For example, as pictured in the graph on the next page 
(“Graph A”), the June 2017 surge in the value of Ether was primarily 
the result of large corporations such as Microsoft and Intel deciding 
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DAO tokens, invented and issued by Slock.it, are intended to be 
an electronic way to improve corporate governance using the block-
chain network and the layer of smart contracts it offers.161 Accord-
ing to the white paper of the firm, the DAO is: 
The first implementation of a Decentralized Auto-
nomous Organization (DAO) code to automate or-
ganizational governance and decision making. The 
code can be used by individuals working together 
collaboratively outside of a traditional corporate 
form. It can also be used by a registered corporate 
entity to automate formal governance rules contained 
in corporate bylaws or imposed by law.162 
As stated, the DAO token is intended to enable corporations  
using it to replace traditional corporate governance mechanisms 
with automated contractual terms which are enforced by using the 
smart contracts on the blockchain. 
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DAO tokens were issued in an ICO in 2016.163 Over a period of 
less than a month—from April 30 until May 28—1.15 million DAO 
tokens were exchanged for approximately twelve million Ether.164 
At the ICO closing time, the estimated value of DAO tokens raised 
in Ether was $150 million USD.165 In exchange for Ether, DAO  
tokens were created and assigned to the blockchain address of the 
person or entity sending out the Ether.166 The holders of the DAO 
tokens were given both ownership and voting rights while standing 
to earn profits as a return on investment from projects funded by 
DAO.167 If these projects turned out to be successful, DAO hold- 
ers would receive the right to vote on whether to reinvest in new  
projects or to distribute the profits to themselves.168 
In order to receive funding in DAO for a project, the “contrac-
tor” had to submit a proposal for a project which could provide DAO 
token holders with a return on their investments.169 To do so, the 
contractor had to write a smart contract, publish it, deploy it on the 
Ethereum blockchain, and post details about it on the DAO web-
site—a website formed by Slock.it in order to promote the DAO to-
kens.170 Proposals, which include a link to the smart contract’s 
source code, could be viewed and voted upon in the DAO, as well 
as other publicly accessible websites.171 In order to post a proposal, 
the contractors needed to possess at least one DAO token and submit 
a deposit using Ether tokens.172 If the proposal did not receive the 
quorum vote of the DAO token holders, the deposit would be for-
feited.173 Before a proposal could be uploaded to the DAO website, 
it was examined by “curators”—a group of people chosen by 
Slock.it who were responsible for examining the proposals for cyber 
security issues.174 These curators made sure the proposals originated 
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from a credible user on the blockchain and decided which of them 
could be submitted to the DAO website and funded by DAO.175    
D. Libra 
The latest—and currently one of the most discussed cryptocur-
rencies—is the Libra project by Facebook.176 The Libra token will 
allow users to send money to others or purchase products with  
almost zero fees. It is intended to be used as a global coin which 
will, in part, replace some of the fiat currencies.177 The Libra will  
be held on a wallet application, such as Facebook’s planned Novi  
wallet (previously named Calibra) which will be built into Messen-
ger, Whatsapp, and its own app.178 
So, how will Libra work? People will be able to cash in local 
currency, receive Libra, spend the Libra as they would any other 
currency, and cash out whenever they want.179 To avoid the fluctu-
ation in Libra’s value, it is tied to a basket of bank deposits and 
short-term government securities—in this manner it is what is 
known as a “stablecoin.”180 The Libra Association—a Swiss based 
association which will oversee the development of the token,  
control the reserve of assets which stabilizes Libra’s value, and  
decide on governance rules for the blockchain—will be able to 
change the balance of the composition of the reserve in order to con-
trol for major price fluctuations.181 Every time a user will ask to sell 
its Libra, the Libra Association will issue a selling order for the fiat 
currency the user requested. To accomplish this, the Association 
will work with a list of authorized resellers.182 
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The founding members of the Libra Association paid a  
minimum of $10M to join—in return they received Libra Invest-
ment Tokens.183 These Investment Tokens will allow members to 
receive dividends from the interest earned on assets in the reserve.184 
The possibility to receive dividends from the interest is in large what 
attracted the Libra Association Members to join, because if a large 
number of users start to use Libra, the reserve will grow and the 
interest will be significant.185 
Libra—unlike its fellow cryptocurrencies DAO, Bitcoin and 
Ether—will run on a blockchain which is not truly decentralized.186 
Although it is designed like other blockchains with the use of 
Merkle trees to guarantee the integrity and a network of nodes, only 
Libra’s founding members—currently there are twenty of them—
will be able to run a node.187 Therefore, the transaction ledger will 
only be accessible for Libra’s founding members.188 
As one can see, these four types of cryptocurrencies—Bitcoin, 
Ether, DAO and Libra—differ vastly from one another. These dif-
ferences give rise to interesting questions about the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies. First, we ask, under what circumstances are cryp-
tocurrencies considered securities? 
V. FINANCIAL REGULATION, CYBER REGULATION, AND THE REGULATION OF 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
Unlike general cyber regulation which focuses mainly on  
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the effects it may have on investors and on financial markets.  
Some aspects should be regulated like any other financial product. 
Financial regulation is needed mainly to protect consumers and to 
ensure stability of financial institutions.189 A financial regulator 
plays a crucial role in providing information to the market, mainly 
through disclosure requirements, which in turn helps the market as-
sign the correct price to the products190 and prevents the problem of 
a market for lemons—a market filled with low quality products.191 
A market for lemons refers to the problem of quality and uncertainty 
in markets where good and bad products are sold and the buyers 
cannot tell the good from the bad.192 In the field of financial prod-
ucts, regulation helps set minimum standards for products, helping 
clear the market of lemons.193 This is essential since, in this case, 
financial regulation protects the market—it helps efficiently allocate 
credit.194 In the absence of financial regulation, some investors 
would be apprehensive about entering the market—this would re-
duce opportunities for corporations seeking to raise capital.195 
Another problem with financial products relates to asymmetric 
information and adverse selection. Adverse selection refers to the 
problem of hidden information.196 When parties hold private,  
non-verifiable information they can, in theory, impose higher costs 
on their contracting parties who cannot tell the reliable service pro-
viders from the dangerous or more costly ones.197 The parties which 
impose the highest costs will be disproportionately likely to enter 
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into a contract at a given price as they know that they can  
extract more rent.198 However, the contracting party knows that the 
more risky party will be the one drawn to the contract and will thus 
raise the price of the contract, ultimately driving out the “good”  
parties, as they know that they are not risky and will not be willing 
to contract at such a high price.199 Here, too, regulation is needed in 
order to protect the market. 
If we examine cryptocurrencies from the perspective of 
protecting the market and the financing opportunities within it,  
allowing those cryptocurrencies which are in fact securities to be 
issued in an ICO bypasses regulatory requirements and may lead to 
suboptimal results when it comes to financing opportunities in the 
financial markets. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the prob-
lems of asymmetric information within cryptocurrencies and lack of 
ability to assess the financial product are heightened by the existence 
of cybersecurity problems.200 The value of the currency depends not 
only on its real-world value but also on its resilience to hackers. Here 
too, moral hazard issues may come into play causing a firm selling 
cryptocurrency to behave differently prior to the purchase of its  
tokens by investors than after the purchase. The best way to prevent 
this from occurring is through regulation. For this reason, regulation 
enforcing disclosure on cryptocurrencies, which are closer in nature 
to securities, is essential. 
However, in the field of cryptocurrencies, disclosure require-
ments hardly exist. Thus, sometimes problems of asymmetric infor-
mation, adverse selection, and markets for lemons can occur. There-
fore, it is in the interest of “good” or “reliable” cryptocurrencies that 
some sort of disclosure would be required of them. The question of 
what should be disclosed—if anything at all—depends on the pur-
pose of the specific token. 
Bitcoin, for example, really does resemble other kinds of fiat 
currencies. Its price is determined by supply and demand and is not 
based on the “efforts of others.” Trying to regulate this token as if  
it were anything other than a currency would not only be wrong, but 
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also diminish its value. Other cryptocurrencies, such as DAO, Ether, 
and Libra do, however, bear a striking resemblance to securities.  
In fact, it seems very likely they are indeed securities—in this case, 
Ether and DAO were issued without compliance with securities laws 
and regulations. To illustrate these differences, the sections below 
examine the implications of each of these different cryptocurrencies 
being a security. 
A. The Implications of Bitcoin, DAO, Ether, and Libra Being a 
Security 
As previously mentioned, the United States heavily regulates  
the issue of securities both under state and federal law. Therefore,  
defining a specific cryptocurrency as a “security” under the federal 
or the state “blue sky”201 laws has serious implications for producing 
the token, trading in the token, and analyzing its underlying tech-
nology. As mentioned earlier, some cryptocurrencies are indeed not 
securities while others should be considered securities under U.S. 
law. In order to make the distinction, the following sections will  
focus on three main laws: (1) the Securities Act of 1933; (2) the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (3) the Investment Company 
Act of 1940. 202 
1. The Securities Act of 1933 
The main goal of the Securities Act is to ensure that all relevant 
information is disclosed to the public so that investors are able to 
evaluate the value of the securities in the market and make 
informed investment decisions.203 In order to do so, the Securities 
Act requires registration before the issuance of securities.204 The 
registration entails filing a registration statement with the SEC, 
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which includes a prospectus providing all the relevant information 
to investors regarding the firm whose shares are about to be 
offered.205 Bitcoin was established by an anonymous person or  
persons, thus it is not known who would be obligated to register the 
issuance of the cryptocurrency.206 However, in the case of Ether, 
DAO, and Libra it is very clear who established the currencies and, 
thus, who has an obligation to register the token prior to the ICO. 
Furthermore, unlike Bitcoin—where mining provides continuous 
production of new tokens and raises the possibility of seeing miners 
as issuers207 which could be expected to result in dramatically  
reduced mining efforts—DAO and Libra cannot be mined  by the 
general public. Thus, the question of how to define miners is irrele-
vant in reference to DAO and Libra. 
A second issue has to do with how cryptocurrencies are traded. 
In the case of securities without a valid registration statement,  
Section 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act allows transactions that fall in-
to certain narrow categories and follow strict requirements.208 Thus, 
if a person buys securities from an issuer in order to resell them, the 
buyer is considered an “underwriter” and must meet the registration 
requirement.209 Since the blockchain is a public ledger and as trans-
actions are publicly disclosed, all users exchanging Bitcoins on the 
blockchain would need to meet the registration requirements.210  
The same would be true for DAO, Ether, and Libra because it is 
logical to demand registration from the enterprise which issued the 
cryptocurrency and not from the users trading it on the blockchain.  
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Under the Exchange Act, any person whose business includes 
effecting transactions in securities—be it one’s own securities  
or other people’s securities—is considered a broker or a dealer.211  
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This impacts stock exchanges trading cryptocurrencies. If Bitcoin, 
DAO, Ether, and Libra are securities, then anyone who facilitates 
the buying or selling of any of these cryptocurrencies must register 
with the SEC as a broker or a dealer, unless they are exempt from 
the regulation.212 In addition, anti-fraud obligations are in place  
under the Securities Exchange Act for anyone selling or buying  
securities.213 If Bitcoin, DAO, Ether, or Libra are indeed securities, 
these restrictions would also regulate the statements issued by the 
sellers of these tokens.214 These regulations could be a potential  
solution to false statements occasionally made during an ICO.215 
3. The Investment Company Act of 1940 
Mutual funds and private investment funds are regulated under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 ( “Investment Company 
Act”).216 Under the Investment Company Act, an “investment  
company” is defined as, among other things, “ . . . any issuer which 
is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,  
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities . . . .”217 If any 
of the cryptocurrencies mentioned in this Article are indeed securi-
ties, then any entity which is established to invest, hold, or trade 
them may be subject to the requirements of the Investment Com-
pany Act.218 These requirements include registration with the 
SEC—unless excluded from the regulation, usually by limiting  
the number of investors or by doing business only with “qualified  
purchasers,” considered to be more sophisticated.219 
B. Are Cryptocurrencies Securities? 
United States securities regulations are drafted broadly so that 
they can cover most of the transactions in which money is raised 
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regulation—based on an analysis of case law which scrutinizes and  
clarifies the term “security”—Bitcoin does not qualify as a security 
due to the fact that it does not fall under the definitions of any  
of the common types of securities nor under the term “invest- 
ment contract.”221 But what about other cryptocurrencies such as  
DAO, Ether, and Libra? 
1. Is DAO a Security? 
It seems that DAO is the clear-cut case in which a cryptocur-
rency is indeed a security and issuing it at an ICO was most  
probably meant to avoid the more costly procedure of an IPO.  
According to Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court illustrates 
that “ . . . some instruments . . . are by their nature investments.”222 
Indeed, the DAO easily falls under the characteristics of “stocks.”223 
The Supreme Court defined the characteristics of a “stock” as: the 
capacity to appreciate in value, the right to receive dividends de-
pending on profits made by the firm, negotiability, having voting 
rights which are dependent on the number of shares one owns, and 
the ability to be “pledged or hypothecated.”224  
The DAO token meets all of the above criteria. The investors 
purchasing the token have the right to vote on projects in which the 
DAO will be invested, they are entitled to a return on their invest-
ments if such projects succeed, and their investments can increase 
or decrease in value. In fact—unlike Bitcoin holders—they are  
entitled to participate in the economic success of the entity.225 
Since DAO falls into the definition of a “stock,” there is no need 
to further examine whether it meets other definitions of securities 
 
221 Id. at 21. In one case involving the shares of a digital hedge fund brought before the 
court, the argument that the shares of the hedge fund in Bitcoin investments sold by the 
hedge fund were not securities was rejected based on the fact that the court found them to 
be “investment contracts.” SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
110018, at *4–6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). However, the court did not say that the Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency itself is an investment contract, but rather that the shares of the hedge fund 
selling the Bitcoin fall under the definition. Alberts & Fry, supra note 140, at 14. 
222 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990). 
223 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975); Landreth Timber Co. 
v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985); Alberts & Fry, supra note 140202, at 10. 
224 Forman, 421 U.S. at 851. 
225 Alberts & Fry, supra note 140, at 10. 
154 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:118 
 
such as futures, derivatives, swaps, or options. If the DAO were  
positioned on a scale of securities, its token would most likely be 
located in very close proximity to actual securities. This is not the 
case for Ether. 
2. Is Ether a Security? 
The most recent and hottest debate among SEC officials relates 
to the question of whether Ether is a security.226 On June 14, 2018, 
William Hinman, the director of the division of corporation finance 
at the SEC stated that “ . . . in cases where there is no . . . central 
enterprise being invested in or where the digital asset is sold only to 
be used to purchase a good or service available through the network 
on which it was created,” that digital asset is “out of the purview of 
U.S. securities laws.”227 The market tends to interpret this statement 
as confirmation that Ether is not a security, and consequently, during 
the course of the hour from when the statement was issued, the price 
of the token jumped from $469 to $516 USD.228 However, this  
question has not yet been formally decided and thus is an interesting 
topic for discussion. 
Unlike DAO, Ether does not fall within the classic definition of 
a stock. Although it can increase or decrease in value and its holders 
are able to exchange it, Ether does not provide token holders with 
dividends or voting rights—both of which are crucial to the defini-
tion of a stock.229 Additionally, similar to Bitcoin,230 it does not meet 
the definition of “security future”—a contractual agreement to sell 
securities, an index, or any interest that is based on the two.231 It is 
also not a “securities-based swap” as it is not a put, call, floor, or 
any similar investment which is based on an index or a security loan, 
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nor is it based on the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of events.232 
However, a financial investment which does not fall into any of the 
categories that define “security” might still be considered one if it 
falls under the basket term “investment contract.”233 
A financial instrument must satisfy three rules to be classified as 
an investment contract. There must be: (1) an investment of money; 
(2) common enterprise; and (3) expectation of profits which are  
derived solely from the efforts of others.234 
In the case of Ether, there is indeed an investment of money. 
Purchasers invest money in return for the token. This falls under the 
broad definition of an investment of money.235 In addition, The 
Ethereum Foundation, the foundation behind Ether, is a Swiss non-
profit organization.236 As such, it can fall under the definition of a 
common enterprise according to the strict vertical communality  
approach.237 Under this approach, courts have examined whether the 
assets of the investors were influenced by the success and  
efforts of the firm seeking the investment.238 In this case, it is clear 
that the marketing efforts of the foundation affect the tokens held by 
the investors. Last but not least, unlike Bitcoin, investors who invest 
in Ether do expect to gain from profits which are derived from the 
efforts of others. To use the Ethereum blockchain, investors are  
required to pay in Ether.239 Thus, the efforts of the foundation to 
promote extensive use of its blockchain also affects the profits of  
all Ether holders. Therefore, it is not farfetched to say that purchas-
ers could have the reasonable expectation that the value of their  
token will rise due to the managerial efforts of the Ethereum Foun-
dation managers. This, on its own, is enough to meet the require-
ments test in Howey.240 
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Therefore, since the Ether token meets all three criteria required 
of a financial instrument in order to be considered an “investment 
contract,” Ether is in fact a security under U.S. law and is subject to 
all securities requirements set by the law. 
3. Is Libra a Security? 
Like Ether, the Libra token also does not fit the traditional  
definition of “stock” as it does not provide token holders with  
dividends or voting rights.241 It also does not meet the definition  
of “security future” which is a contractual agreement to sell securi-
ties, an index, or any interest that is based on the two.242 It is also 
not a “securities-based swap” as it is not a put, call, floor, or any 
similar investment which is based on an index or a security loan,  
nor is it based on the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of events.243 
However, similar to Ether, the interesting question is—is Libra an 
“investment contract”? 
Recall the basics of the Howey test and the cases which  
followed, as well as the SEC’s Guidelines—in order to meet the  
criteria of being an “investment contract” the financial instrument 
must satisfy three rules.244 There must be: (1) an investment of 
money; (2) common enterprise; and (3) expectation of profits which 
are derived solely from the efforts of others.245 Examining Libra 
through these three requirements shows that: (1) there is an invest-
ment of money; (2) the Libra Association is a common enterprise; 
and (3) as Facebook plans to market and distribute Libra on 
Whatsapp—Facebook’s own messenger and its standalone app 
called Novi (a new Facebook subsidiary)—holders can definitely 
expect to gain profits which are derived solely from the efforts of 
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others. In addition, unlike Ether, the reserve ratio of the cryptocur-
rency—which affects the value of the token—will be determined  
by the Association members.246 Therefore, Libra is even more sus-
ceptible to profits derived from the efforts of others than Ether. 
Due to all that is mentioned above, it seems that the new Libra 
is indeed an investment contract, even though the idea behind it  
is to make it more similar to a fiat currency. Therefore, the Libra  
Association will be well advised to issue the token in accordance  
to US securities regulations. 
C. How Should Cryptocurrencies be Regulated? 
Strict anti-money laundering and anti-fraud measures should be 
taken with respect to all tokens. This is especially true in an area of 
new technology such as blockchain. Without proper measures to 
prevent fraud, investor confidence in the market can collapse due to 
a single case of fraud that becomes publicly known.247 This results 
in investors changing their perceptions about the market, and in a 
drop of financing opportunities for similar firms.248 Investor con-
fidence is crucial in sectors which rely on uncertain future events  
and technological innovation. If not prevented in cryptocurrencies,  
repeated and well publicized fraud cases can also be detrimental to 
the future use of blockchain technology. 
Indeed, fraudulent behavior is not scarce in the world of crypto-
currencies. On December 4, 2017, the SEC obtained an emergency 
order from Eastern District of New York to enjoin an allegedly 
fraudulent ICO scheme.249 The SEC alleged that Dominic Lacroix 
and his company PlexCorps violated the anti-fraud and registra- 
tion provisions of U.S. federal securities laws.250 Lacroix and his  
company allegedly collected up to $15 million from investors in  
exchange for digital tokens and promised them a thirteen-fold profit 
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in less than a month.251 Following the complaint, the district court 
granted the SEC’s request to freeze the defendant’s assets.252 
To prevent such fraudulent behavior and to protect the new 
blockchain technology, all cryptocurrencies should be subject to 
anti-fraud regulation. Regarding anti-money laundering regulation, 
all cryptocurrencies should have a Know-Your-Client procedure  
before allowing users to enter the blockchain.253 In addition, tokens 
should not be completely anonymous. Meaning, in the name of  
privacy, blockchain users should not be able to ascertain the identity 
of other blockchain users. Instead, the association or company  
issuing the coin should be able to answer regulatory requirements  
to unveil the identity of the users in order to expose money launder-
ing and scams. 
Regarding financial regulation, as previously identified in this 
Article, different types of cryptocurrencies require different regula-
tory solutions.254 In order to determine the most relevant regulations, 
we should first examine the token at hand and ask whether it falls 
under U.S. securities laws or whether it is more similar to a fiat  
currency.255 Unlike other financial investments, another important 
step in classifying a specific cryptocurrency is to examine the pur-
pose of issuing a token. In some instances, issuing the token in an 
ICO is only meant to circumvent the stricter requirements of issuing 
a security in an IPO or raising capital by approaching a venture  
capital firm.256 But in other cases, issuing a token makes sense  
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This question should be taken into consideration by regulators  
before they decide which type of regulation should apply. 
After classifying the cryptocurrency, specific regulatory tools 
should be applied. If the cryptocurrency is determined to be a secu-
rity, all regulatory demands normally required of securities should 
certainly be enforced. Regarding disclosure, the question would then 
be: what should be disclosed to investors during the ICO? 
1. Disclosure Requirements for Cryptocurrencies that are 
Securities 
Similar to IPOs, significant information asymmetries exist in 
ICOs between the managers of the startup issuing the token and  
the investors buying it.258 The regulators seem to think that manda-
tory disclosure requirements are the answer to such information  
asymmetries, and that retail investors would read information  
that is provided to them. This is evident in the requirement of the  
SEC to use “plain English” in the prospectus.259 However, it is 
widely known that retail investors do not read all the technical infor- 
mation detailed in prospectuses’ hundreds of pages, nor do they  
read the issuer’s mandated information in the secondary market.260  
Rather, retail investors usually rely on the market price which em-
bodies all the relevant information about the firm.261 
Still, requiring securities’ issuers to disclose all relevant, though 
partially technical, information benefits investors. While in all like-
lihood most retail investors do not read the disclosed information,262 
underwriters, analysts, and sophisticated buyers, such as institu-
tional investors, do.263 The fact that sophisticated market players 
read and process information and determine the price of shares  
allows all other investors to “free ride” their efforts to participate in 
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the market.264 Furthermore, at the margins of the primary market, 
where intermediaries are bypassed, disclosure requirements help 
protect naive investors from buying overpriced securities as the reg-
ulators screen the prospectus before allowing the IPO.265 This way, 
cases of fraud are minimized and the required detailed information 
makes punishing fraudsters easier “ex post.”266 
When issuing shares, the issuer on the primary market must  
disclose a vast amount of information. Such information should  
include its own historical background as well as a detailed and tech-
nical description of the firm, the shares issued, and all other material 
information that can be relevant to investors.267 An important dis-
tinction between different regulatory regimes relates to the question 
of whether only past information should be disclosed or whether for-
ward-looking information should also be disclosed. Disclosing only 
past events reduces the cost of disclosure and makes it easier for 
investors to compare between different firms. However, forward-
looking information may also be valuable for investors and might 
have an effect on the share’s price.268 The SEC has acknowledged 
that the prospects for future earnings are important to investors and 
so allows inclusion of some information of this type.269 
When issuing a token, which is a security under the legal  
definition, the basic mandated disclosure should be the same for all 
other securities. In the words of Jay Clayton of the SEC: 
I believe that initial coin offerings—whether they 
represent offerings of securities or not—can be  
effective ways for entrepreneurs and others to raise 
funding, including for innovative projects. However, 
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securities must be accompanied by the important  
disclosures, processes and other investor protections 
that our securities laws require. A change in the 
structure of a securities offering does not change  
the fundamental point that when a security is  
being offered, our securities laws must be followed.  
Said another way, replacing a traditional corporate 
interest recorded in a central ledger with an enter-
prise interest recorded through a blockchain entry  
on a distributed ledger may change the form of the  
transaction, but it does not change the substance.270 
Indeed, the managers of the enterprise issuing the token have 
detailed information about their business, their plans and initiatives, 
as well as their marketing capabilities—which are especially crucial 
in the field of cryptocurrencies. They also have relevant information 
regarding trends or issues that may affect their business, the value 
of their token, future operating results, and/or financial conditions. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this Article, the value of the 
cryptocurrency depends not only on the value of the currency, but 
also on issues of security.271 These issues are present in full force 
during the period of the ICO. Therefore, unlike regular securities, 
additional information should be disclosed to investors. 
As with all regular securities, upon issuing an ICO, one of the 
first disclosure requirements should pertain to the description of the 
characteristics of the enterprise (usually a startup company) issuing 
the token. This description should include an ecosystem in which 
the new token is issued, a detailed description of the startup, its  
incorporation and team details, and possible current and future  
competitors. An in-depth description of the token, what it sets out to 
achieve, and the reason why issuing it in an ICO is necessary to the 
success of the product should also be included. Another relevant 
question which must be addressed is—what will investors’ money 
be used for? To what specific rights are they entitled upon the 
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purchase of the token? Furthermore, an explanation of how the value 
is created and how it enters the cryptocurrency ecosystem should be 
provided to the investors. Here, the disclosure would explain how 
the token is used and sold—that is, only in the specific app devel-
oped by the issuing startup or in other apps as well as how an inves-
tor sells his token.272 Governance issues should also be addressed, 
including questions of: How does the startup issuing the token de-
cide to add new features to it? How do they react to changes in com-
puting technology? When and how do they decide to change net-
work parameters? How would they manage crises and what mecha-
nisms are there to detect and resolve bugs?273 In addition, a thorough 
description of the measures taken to secure the ICO should be pro-
vided. These details should include an explanation of the blockchain 
infrastructure supporting the ICO, whether it is public or private,  
and if the code has been publicly published.274 Furthermore, there 
should be a disclosure regarding the identity of the person who wrote 
the token issuance contracts and the software used should be in 
place. Security measures should also be disclosed—for example, 
was a cybersecurity audit performed prior to the ICO? 275 And if so, 
what were the results?   
With that said, disclosure requirements are only useful if there 
are information intermediaries in the market that can provide the  
token issuer with their reputation. It is therefore expected that as 
mandatory disclosure demands become a requirement for token  
issuers, information intermediaries will enter the arena and assist  
investors by processing the information and putting the right price 
tag on the token. This will assist in stabilizing the market and allow-
ing capital to flow in an efficient way. 
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But, what about cryptocurrencies that are not securities— 
should we regulate them beyond the general anti-fraud regulation? 
If so, how? 
2. Regulation of Cryptocurrencies that Are Not Securities 
The question of regulation is more complex when it comes to 
cryptocurrencies that are closer to a real currency. In such cases, we 
generally do not need to protect the market, as these tokens are not 
taking away resources from the securities market. Therefore, at first 
glance, there is no need for regulatory intervention, apart from anti-
fraud regulatory measures which can prevent token issuers from 
promising to issue a token, collecting the money, and then disap-
pearing. To clarify this point—as we do not prevent investors from 
buying shares in private firms without mandated disclosure, or from 
taking all their money and buying a trip around the world—regula-
tory intervention is not needed in places where there is no market 
failure which prevents the mar-ket from being efficient. Therefore, 
the question should be: is there a market failure related to the sale  
of cryptocurrencies that are currencies and not securities or other  
financial products? The answer to that is, in some cases, yes. 
Market failures may become apparent as a result of cryptocur-
rencies that are not securities when these tokens become systemi-
cally important and affect financial institutions. As mentioned  
previously, systemic risk results from the interconnectedness of 
firms on the financial markets.276 Interconnectedness results from 
the fact that the value of one firm in the market is dependent on the 
payoffs it receives from its claims on other firms. The value of these 
claims depends, in turn, on the stability of other firms and so on.277 
When firms are interconnected, the failure of one financial institu-
tion might have a cascading effect and bring down other large finan-
cial institutions in a chain reaction. 
If financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, 
start getting involved with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, then the 
fluctuation in the price of the token might affect the stability of the 
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financial institutions. This in turn may cause an increase in systemic 
risk in the “real world” financial system. For example, even though 
the insurance industry has responded slowly to the surge of crypto-
currencies and ICOs, some insurance companies, such as the Great 
American Insurance Group, have added protection against crypto-
currency theft to their existing business crime policy.278 Banks were 
also keen to join in on the trend.279 Barclays has become the first 
bank to accept Bitcoin.280 The bank began by allowing people to 
make donations in Bitcoins.281 It then started allowing a U.S. mobile 
payment startup—backed by Goldman Sachs, which uses Bitcoin to 
transfer central bank currencies—to use its infrastructure.282 
All of the above mentioned traits give rise to concerns  
involving increased systemic risk in the financial system and  
require regulatory intervention. Here, regulators should find a way 
to regulate the token or, if not, it would be advised to prohibit  
financial institutions from joining and engaging in activities that 
may expose them to fluctuations in cryptocurrency prices, therefore 
increasing systemic risk in the financial system. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, different types of cryptocurrencies behave differ-
ently from one another. Although the technology underpinning most 
cryptocurrencies is quite similar, the logic behind them differs. 
Some cryptocurrencies function as regular national currencies and 
possess traits of traditional currency. As such, they provide a me-
dium of exchange, unit of account, and/or store of value. However, 
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other cryptocurrencies may represent different rights as well.  
This fascinating phenomenon essentially leads to some crypto- 
currencies being viewed more closely to real national currencies 
while others appear more akin to financial products—such as secu-
rities or derivatives. 
The cryptocurrency phenomenon requires regulatory authorities 
to investigate each new ICO and to determine the token’s classifica-
tion. Some tokens, such as Bitcoin, actually do resemble currency 
and should therefore only be regulated to ensure that fraudulent  
behavior is prevented. These types of cryptocurrencies should be 
more carefully regulated in case they increase systemic risk in  
the general financial system. Other tokens—such as DAO, Ether, 
and Libra—resemble securities and should be regulated accord-
ingly. The main distinction between the two types of cryptocurren-
cies relates to the question of whether or not their value is dependent 
on the efforts of others. 
For cryptocurrencies that are in fact securities, additional man-
datory disclosure should be required with respect to security issues 
surrounding the ICO. Investors should be informed about what kind 
of blockchain technology is being used, who developed the code, 
and whether it was published publicly. In addition, information 
about what kind of cyber audits were conducted prior to the issuance 
of the coin is essential. 
The steps and solutions suggested by this Article should support 
regulatory authorities in their ability to protect financial markets 
while still allowing room for innovation. 
 
